http://corp.bankofamerica.com/portal/portal/fr_pdfs/efp0501.pdf

Economic and Financial Perspectives
April 30, 2001 Vol. 12, No. 3
Mickey D. Levy
Peter E. Kretzmer David L. Roberts
The Uneven Economic Slump
The current economic slump has resulted from the 1999-2000 monetary tightening that generated slower demand, the
negative supply shocks imposed by higher energy costs and the dramatically higher costs of capital that have constrained
production and investment. The sharp reversal of these cyclical and structural factors that drove the earlier robust economic
performance and soaring NASDAQ have produced an uneven economic deceleration: while consumer spending has slowed
to a moderate growth pace and housing activity has remained firm, businesses are aggressively cutting production and capital
spending, and profits are falling sharply, a reversal from their earlier double-digit gains. Slowing imports and a narrowing
trade deficit will provide a partial offset to weaker domestic demand. This pattern is expected to generate modest real GDP
growth in the first half of 2001, with moderate downside risks posed by slower consumption growth. In lagged response,
the unemployment rate is projected to rise to 5 percent by year-end. Recent and expected further monetary easing are
projected to stimulate demand later this year, but lingering weakness in capital spending may inhibit the pace of recovery.
Meanwhile, core inflation has drifted up, and is well above the Federal Reserves long-run objective.
Insofar as the negative supply shocks constrain production and capacity growth while monetary policy influences aggregate
demand, the Feds job is difficult. Monetary policy is not capable of short-run smoothing of the negative implications of
the supply constraints. Nevertheless, the Fed is pressured to ease dramatically; effectively it is being asked to address short-
run issues beyond its control. In this environment, the Fed must avoid over-managing the economy (or the stock market)
and return to the pursuit of its long-run objective of price stability.
The following paper was presented by Mickey D. Levy to the Shadow Open Market Committee in Washington, DC,
April 29-30, 2000.
The Boom: Its Sources and Characteristics
The capital market and monetary policy adjustments to the
Asian crisis and the subsequent financial turmoillower
interest rates, sharply falling energy and commodity prices
and an appreciating U.S. dollar, and aggressive monetary
easing in Fall 1998generated robust but unsustainable
economic and financial market performance. The sharp fall
in interest rates, declining energy prices, surge in net capital
inflows, and monetary easing provided traditional demand
stimulusin many ways, characteristic of traditional early
cyclical rebounds from recessionwhile falling energy and
commodity prices and sharply falling costs of capital associ-
ated with surging stock valuations provided positive supply
shocks.
While the Asian crisis changed the composition of nominal
spending growthstronger domestic demand and a sharply
widening trade deficit, and higher real output and lower
inflationthe Feds aggressive easing in Fall 1998 gener-
ated the first marked acceleration of nominal spending growth
of the decade. Nominal GDP growth jumped to 8.2 percent
year-over-year in 2000Q2 from its 5-year average pace of 5.6
percent (see Chart 1). Real consumption growth accelerated
with the Asian crisis to 5.0 percent year-over-year by 1998Q2
and 6 percent in 2002Q1, a year following the initial Fed
tightening. At the same time, investment and profits soared
in absolute terms and relative to GDP.
The sky-high valuations in the NASDAQ and the boom in
high technology investment went hand-in-hand: from mid-
1997 through mid-2000, when business fixed investment
rose 12.5 percent annualized, almost 80 percent of the growth
occurred in information processing equipment and software.
Some of the strongest increases occurred in industries that
enjoyed the lowest costs of capital. By year-end 2000,
business fixed investment had risen to 15.3 percent of GDP,
up from 9.6 percent in 1990, and information processing
equipment and software had risen to 49.5 percent of total
business fixed investment, up from 21.3 percent in 1990 (see
Chart 2).
Although nominal spending growth accelerated to a danger-
ously high rate relative to long-run productive capacity, core
inflation remained low and stable while productivity and real
output surged (see Chart 3). The booming spending on
capital characterized by declining prices and low labor
intensity of production contributed to these highly favorable
conditions. The robust labor productivity growth flattened
unit labor costs and widened profit margins.
Even though the full force of the monetary stimulus and
positive supply shocks were temporary, the surges in produc-
tivity-driven economic and financial performance buoyed
expectations, and longer-run forecasts became extrapola-
tions of recent trends. Based on robust growth and labor
productivity gains, estimates of sustainable potential growth
were adjusted up dramatically, in some cases well above 4
percent, while unrealistic expected rates of return on capital
investment fueled bloated stock valuations relative to earn-
ings potential. The downward adjustment of these expecta-
tions has highlighted the slumping economic and financial
conditions.
The Feds inadvertently procyclical role in the robust growth
of 1998 though mid-2000, which set the stage for the slump,
should not be overlooked. In short, in response to a variety
of conditions, the Fed remained too easy too long and then
tightened too much in 2000. The Fed would have tightened
monetary policy in early 1998 if not for concerns about the
negative impact of the Asian crisis; it eased aggressively
amid continued healthy economic growth in the second half
of 1998 in response to concerns about the fragile state of
financial markets and financial institutions; and it left in
place an expansionary policy during most of 1999, well after
the financial crisis had dissipated, growth accelerated and
stock valuations rose strongly. Concerns about Y2K likely
deterred the Fed from tightening more rapidly in late 1999.
For whatever reasons, the Feds accommodative monetary
policy facilitated the booming economic and financial mar-
ket performance.
By year-end 1999, the Fed had raised the funds rate back to
5.5percent,itslevel priortotheAsian crisis,andwhilemoney
growth had slowed, the earlier bulge in money associated
with the 1998 easing had not been drained. Instead, it was
generating accelerating demand. In the first half of 2000, the
Fed raisedthefundsrate 100basispoints,the last50atits May
meeting, after evidence of economic slowdown already had
appeared.
The Uneven Slump
By May 2000, the Feds monetary thrust was restrictive, with
sharply slower money growth and an inverted Treasury yield
curve. Bond yields had risen, and energy prices had soared
dramatically above pre-Asian crisis levels. The higher en-
ergyprices adverselyaffecteddemandand alsoareanegative
supply shock; they effectively operate like a tax hike, reduc-
ing real demand for goods and services while simultaneously
raising business costs. Since then, the NASDAQ has fallen
over 60 percent from its peak, and broader stock indexes also
have declined. While monetary tightening and higher en-
ergy prices slowed aggregate demand, the higher energy
prices and dramatic rise in the costs of capital associated with
falling stock valuations constrained production, investment
and productive capacity.
The fall in the stock market has had a larger impact on
business investment that on consumer spending. While real
consumption has slowed by half to 3 percent annualized in
2000Q4-2001Q1, capital spending has flattened following
its earlier 14 percent growth rate (see Chart 4). It declined 0.1
percent in 2000Q4 and rose 1.1 percent in 2001Q1, and is
forecast to decline in the next several quarters.
The wealth effect on consumption tends to be over-empha-
sized. Even generous estimates of the elasticity of consump-
tion with respect to wealth of .04 imply that a $2.5 trillion
reduction in wealth is associated with a 1 percent decline in
consumption(0.7 percentdeclineinGDP). Fromitspeak,the
market capitalization of the Wilshire 5000, a broad stock
index, has fallen approximately $3.4 trillion (22.8 percent).
While consumer spending has been dampened by falling
stock values, it has been supported by continued healthy
growth of disposable personal income and falling interest
rates. Motor vehicle sales are lower than their all-time peak,
but their 17.1 million annual sales rate in 2001Q1 remains
high. Financial incentives have supported sales at the
expense ofnarrowermanufacturermargins. Chainstoresales
have weakened. But consumption of services, which include
health and education services, and business and personal
services, and constitute almost 60 percent of total consump-
tion, continues to grow at a moderating pace.
In contrast, the tailspin in the NASDAQ and the more mod-
erate declines in the broader stock indexes have had a
significant impact on business investment. Although a
relatively smallshareofGDP, businessfixedinvestmentnow
is contributing negatively to the economic slump, following
its strong positive contribution to the earlier boom in produc-
tivity-driven growth (from 1996 through 2000Q2, consid-
ered separately, its growth constituted 32 percent of the 4.6
percent annualized real GDP growth). Business investment
and inventory adjustment to slower demand traditionally are
large swing factors during economic slumps.
The negative influences of slumping demand and profits on
business investment are being accentuated by the sharply
higher costs of capital and its lessened availability, particu-
larly in industries that fueled the earlier investment boom in
information technology and electronics. One would expect
diminishing returns on rapid growth in investment. In fact,
the unrealistic expectations associated with the technology
boom and NASDAQ bubble generated many uneconomic
investments with negative returns. The reversal of the NAS-
DAQ bubble and bloated expectations are particularly dam-
aging. For the average company, the steep fall in the NAS-
DAQ has tripled the cost of capital from equity issuance.
Others have been less fortunate: dramatic declines in valu-
ations in public and private markets have impaired some
companies. The moribund high yield bond market for
telecommunications has severely hampered debt capital
raising. And the flow of venture capital into startup compa-
nies has dried, postponing investment.
We project declining capital spending through year-end. A
10 percent decline would not be extreme relative to previous
downturns. This would dampen the pace of the economic
rebound. The costs of capital and distinct shifts in expecta-
tions and investor risk preferences raise uncertainty.
Corporate profits and capital spending go hand-in-hand: in
typical cyclical fashion, profits are declining, and the inven-
tory adjustment process, including aggressive discounting
and writeoffs, accentuates those declines. Slower product
demand is accompanied by squeezed margins, as slower
productivity gains push up operating costs while pricing
flexibility is constrained. Profits, which always fluctuate
significantly more widely than economic output, are pro-
jected to decline approximately 10 percent in the first half of
2001 and not rebound in the second half.
Inflation: Ignored but too High
Overthe lastyear,headlineconsumer priceinflationhasbeen
pushed up to 3.0 percent, while the core CPI (excluding food
and energy)hasdriftedup modestlyto2.7percent. Thechain-
weightedGDPprice indexrose3.2percent in2001Q1andthe
personal consumption deflator rose 3.3 percent. These are
above the Feds long-run objectives. Wage compensation
has accelerated (the employment cost index has picked up to
4.1 percent year-over-year) and the cyclical slowdown in
labor productivity gains is putting upward pressure on unit
labor costs. ULCs rose 4.3 percent annualized in 2000Q4,
lifting their year-over-year rise to 2.3 percent; further in-
creases are projected in the first half of 2001. The sharp
slowdown in nominal spending growth since 2000Q3 is
expected to dampen inflation temporarily, but the antici-
pated reacceleration of nominal GDP growth in response to
the aggressive monetary easing, coming at a time when high
energy prices and lower capital spending may limit trend
growth of real output, may exert inflation pressures. The
sharp steepening of the yield curve as the Fed has eased
suggests that while the Feds primary focus is on the eco-
nomic slump, market participants remain concerned about
the long-run inflation outlook and the sustainability of low
short-term interest rates.
Adjusting Toward Economic Rebound
The duration of the economic slump and the shape of the
rebound hinge on several key issues: 1) how rapidly are the
adjustments necessary to stabilize the economy and generate
a rebound unfolding? and 2) what are the ongoing impacts of
the higherenergypricesand highercostsofcapital? Arelated
issue concerns whether consumer spending will hold up
following the decline in stock valuations and falling produc-
tion and investment.
In general, the adjustments in the goods, labor and capital
markets have been rapid, and the Fed has eased very aggres-
sively. Interest rates have adjusted rapidly: since the first
signs of economic slowdown emerged in Spring 2000, bond
yields and mortgage rates have fallen dramatically, provid-
ing support for consumption and housing. Since late 2000,
businesses have aggressively cut production and labor in-
puts. The dramatic inventory reversal, from $55.8 billion in
2000Q4 to a decline of $7.1 billion in 2001Q1, suggests the
adjustment is nearing completion (it has much further to go in
electronicsandIT,but thosesectorscomprisea relativelysmall
portion of total manufacturing--see Chart 6). In the absence of
the negative supply shocks, factors in place point toward a
rebound in demand and output in the second half of 2001.
Since late 2000, the adjustment in production and undesired
inventories is most apparent in motor vehicles: sales in
2001Q1 (17.1 million annualized) far exceeded scaled-back
production (10.6 million annualized), and inventories are
quickly moving toward manageable levels. The same is true
of other durable goods manufacturing industries. Businesses
have also cut labor inputs (employment and aggregate hours
worked flattened), propping up productivity gains.
The notable exception is in the electronics and IT industries,
where inventories have risen dramatically and new orders are
falling. Stabilizationinthesesectors, whichrequiresapickup
in sales (and likely dramatic cuts in margins and corporate
writeoffs), hinges on a turnaround in capital spending. Ac-
cordingly, the adjustment process may be prolonged and
painful, imposing a drag on economic recovery as well as
measured labor productivity. Again, this is the localized
downside of the earlier boom.
The near-term risk is that consumption weakens further.
Although continued healthy growth in disposable income
and fallinginterestratessupport consumption,joblayoffsare
mounting and the unemployment rate is edging up. The 4-
week moving average of initial unemployment claims has
risen to 395,000, a 30+ percent jump from last Springs low,
nonfarm payrolls are flattening, and the unemployment rate
isexpected toriseto5 percent(seeChart7). Weakretailsales
inMarch(down 0.2percent)establisha poorstartfor2001Q2.
Real consumption is projected to grow approximately 2-2.5
percent in the middle quarters of 2001. However, consump-
tion is not expected to fall: its deceleration to date has been
akeyfeatureof theeconomicadjustment,and hasbeeninline
with the falling stock market, which has begun to level off;
surveys of consumer confidence also have begun to stabilize;
and interest rates have fallen sharply. Moreover, the sus-
tained strength of housing activity is consistent with contin-
ued spending on household durable goods.
Additionally, the negative impact on domestic production of
slumping demand is partially mitigated by a narrowing trade
deficit. Importsarefallingwith weakerdomesticdemandand
declining capital spending, and despite slowing export
growth, the net export deficit shrank in 2001Q1. From 1996-
2000, the widening trade deficit subtracted arithmetically
0.8 percent annually from GDP; in 2001Q1, it declined
sharply and added 1.4 percent to annualized GDP growth in
2001. Further declines in the trade deficit are projected.
The Feds monetary policy is now stimulative, and eventu-
ally will generate a rebound in spending. Monetary thrust is
not as stimulative as the sharp accelerations of MZM and M2
suggest: their growth picked up prior to the Feds initial 50
basis point easing in early January 2000, reflecting asset
reallocations from stocks into money market funds and bank
CDs, and since early January their annualized growth rates
have exploded to 26.5 percent and 13.5 percent, respectively,
with no signs of slowing. Monetary base (reserves plus
currency) growth has accelerated more modestly to 5.7 per-
cent, reflecting weak loan demand (see Chart 8). At the same
time, the yield curve has steepened sharply due to lower short
rates, corroborating the Feds monetary easing: amid 200
basis pointsoffederalfunds ratereductions,30-yearTreasury
bond yields have risen about 30 basis points to 5.8 percent
while 2-year notes have fallen from 5.0 percent to 4.2 percent
(see Chart 9). The monetary stimulus is expected to generate
a renewed acceleration in nominal spending growth in the
secondhalfof 2001,followingayear ofsub-4percentgrowth
(it grew 3.4 percent annualized in the second half of 2000 and
is projected to grow approximately 4.5 percent annualized in
the first half of 2001).
While higher energy prices may prolong the lag between
monetary ease and an acceleration of aggregate demand,
sustained weakness in capital spending may skew the com-
position of the pickup, in part toward higher inflation. This
would accentuate the unevenness of the rebound, following
the uneven pattern of the slump, and exert more pressure on
inflation and ULCs..
Comment on Fed Policy
Thenatureofthe economicslumpraisesa point ofcautionfor
the Fed. Monetary policy is an aggregate demand tool that
is incapable of short-term smoothing of the negative impacts
of negative supply shocks. In particular, the sharp decline in
capital spending due to the NASDAQ collapse is relatively
localized; lower interest rates per se cannot stabilize IT
capital spending, and attempts to prop up the NASDAQ (to
reducethecost ofcapital)aremisguided. Similarly,monetary
attempts to offset the negative short-run impacts of wrong-
headed energy policies in California are mistaken.
The Fed must avoid the temptation to over-manage the
economy, instead pursuing its long-run objective of stable,
low inflation. Well-intended but misguided wide swings in
monetary policy recall past problems, when monetary policy
was a source of instability, rather than the consistent policy
tool that has gained substantial credibility in recent decades.
In addition, except in emergencies, the Fed should avoid
intermeeting policy changes and foster predictability rather
than surprise.


This report is for information purposes only, is not to be construed as advice or a recommendation to invest assets, and is based on information
available to the public from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation is made that it is accurate or complete, and no information herein
should be relied upon as such. Opinions and projections found in this report reflect our opinion as of the report date and are subject to change
without notice. Banc of America Securities LLC is a subsidiary of Bank of America Corporation and is a member of NYSE, NASD and SIPC.